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Abstract 
 
Prior research on citizen support for European integration has primarily focused on 
individuals’ evaluations of the process of integration or its institutions, with emphasis on the 
importance of direct benefits and costs integration can confer. Explanations focus on overall 
support for integration and little work has been done on explaining public opinion on specific 
policy areas, such as the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This 
paper will fill this gap in the research by synthesizing systems theory with social identity theory 
to produce a core claim that the probability of supporting the CFSP increases with greater levels 
of political trust in the European Union member-states, most notably France and Germany. This 
variable is critical since integration’s development is influenced strongly by, and dependent on, 
the resources of the relatively more powerful European member-states. The results hold even 
when controlling for other factors. Binary logistic regression analysis using pooled repeated 
cross-sectional data from the Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 1992 through 1997 among 
individuals of 11 member-states largely support these claims.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association Fourteenth Biennial Conference, 
March 5-7. 2014, Boston, Massachusetts.  
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Introduction: Political community, European integration, and a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy 
The crises in the Ukraine and the Levant, and their impact on the EU, once again raise the 
issue of formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The idea behind the CFSP 
is to secure the gains of regional integration from external threats with the goal of having a single 
European voice on external affairs. It was introduced as one of three pillars of European 
integration in the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) and then later given a greater 
institutional framework in the Amsterdam Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon created the office of 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and an 
intergovernmental approach of the CFSP among the member-states. Given the critical role many 
EU citizens have in the future of European integration through referenda, it is important to 
explain their level of support for a CFSP.  
The CFSP is part of the overall plan to develop a political community among EU member 
states. A political community refers to the cohesion that emphasizes individuals being drawn 
together for the purpose of operating in a common structure. (Haas 1958; Easton 1965; Etzioni 
1965). With greater political cohesion we would see greater support for European integration 
policies such as the CFSP. In the case of the EU, decision-making is primarily in the hands of the 
member-countries (Moravcsik 1991 & 1993). They, through Intergovernmental Conferences and 
the European Council, determine the amount of sovereignty given to EU institutions as well as 
the direction of integration.  
However, not all member-states have equal weight in these decisions and an examination 
of the European power hierarchy is important when explaining integration (Efird and Genna 
2002). The European power hierarchy refers to the pattern of power distribution among the 
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member-states and how decision-making will generally focus on the preferences of the more 
powerful (i.e., larger and wealthier) member-states. Therefore, when attempting to explain why 
individuals would support a CFSP, we need to consider how they perceive the motivations of the 
more powerful member-states. The central argument that we put forward in this paper is that 
individuals’ support for the CFSP depends on the level of trust given to the more powerful 
member-states, namely Germany.  
The remainder of this paper has four sections. First, we discuss the existing literature on 
support for European integration. Second, we present the theory of this paper in greater detail 
and formulate testable hypotheses. Third, we describe the data that we use in order to test our 
theoretical claims. Fourth, we discuss the results of our statistical analysis. The final section 
concludes with some practical implications of our findings.  
Self-interest, trust, and cooperation 
Addressing the question of why individuals would support the potential CFSP requires an 
assessment of work on overall support for European integration. Easton’s (1965; 1975) 
theoretical work views public support as being either specific (also known as utilitarian support) 
or affective. This section differentiates the motivations of both types and concludes that given 
differing motivations, variables that explain one type of support may not be as powerful in 
explaining the other type. Specifically, motivations for utilitarian support are primarily self-
interest in nature while affective support stems from a common interest motivation. Utilitarian 
support results from an exchange where outputs (which can be economic or non-economic gains 
for the individual) are provided by the state in order to maintain the system through citizen 
support (Easton 1965: 157). Utilitarian support is especially popular among researchers in the 
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context of European integration. They build upon the conceptualization of self-interest, which 
has long been the cornerstone of understanding political decisions (Olson 1965).  
Researchers point to the fact that motivations for utilitarian support arise from evaluations 
of the EU providing rewards that minimize any negative effects, including the changing role of 
the EU as integration evolves (Anderson and Reichert 1996). Feld and Wildgen’s (1976) work 
shows a tie between support levels in the four core countries of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) to that of welfare increases in the early years of integration. The attempt at 
explaining support continued with Handley (1981) who descriptively notes that the economic 
downturns of the 1970s dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. Eichenberg and Dalton 
(1993) refined the testing of this argument by looking at the various levels of influence on 
support levels with similar results. Others have also built upon this method of analysis with 
similar results (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Duch and Taylor 1997). Moreover, others have 
taken a more direct approach by examining an individual’s socio-economic position and predict 
the probability of their support given an individual’s position in the economy and the theoretical 
outcomes of the effects of market integration (Anderson 1991; Gabel and Palmer 1995; 
Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998).  
Self-interested motivations are not necessary economic. The founders of European 
integration were driven by the memories of catastrophic wars and hoped that regional integration 
would be a vehicle for a permanent peace (Deutsch et al 1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 
1966). Europeans supported integration, in its early years, in part for its promise to prevent war 
(Hewstone 1986). However, with the passing memory of war and the end of the Cold War, 
physical security is not as strong a factor in supporting integration as it once was (Gabel 1998). 
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Other benefits include a more effective form of governance that is lacking at the national level 
due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and high levels of corruption (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).  
These studies provide insights into utilitarian support levels, but answer only a narrow 
range of questions and provide, at best, short-term explanations. Business cycles and other 
factors that lead to self-interest motivations help to explain utilitarian support, but may not be 
able to explain the support that will produce stability in the system in the long term. These 
models assume that individuals make no other calculations and beg the question if this alone is 
enough to explain support. While significant in their contribution, it tells us only part of the story 
behind citizen support. The other half of the story begins by understanding affective support. 
Affective support is a “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to 
accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging 
to their wants” (Easton 1965: 273; 1975: 444). It is therefore “an attachment to a political object 
for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As such, it taps deep political 
sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointment with outputs” (1965: 274). What 
“an attachment” refers to in this context is not quite clear. Easton does mention that it is 
associated to a “sense of community” (1965: 325) but this concept also lacks specificity by 
leaving its definition as “the degree of solidarity” (1965: 184). Affective support enters the 
picture when the political system has a “communal ideology” that promotes a common interest 
(Easton 1965: 333).  
Explanations for supporting integration by understanding the role of common interests are 
not new. One of the more cited sets of work in this area is the postmaterialist argument. Inglehart 
(1971; 1977a; 1977b) claims that Europeans were socialized in an environment of high rates of 
economic growth. As a result, individuals in the post-war era developed a different set of values 
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(different from prior generations) that are amiable toward the prospects of regional integration. 
These individuals personally identify with supranational institutions and thereby give the process 
their support. However, Janssen (1991) and Gabel (1998) dispute this claim. Their research finds 
little evidence for the relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration. In fact, 
the little evidence that does exist indicates that postmaterialists are less likely to support 
integration. However, the problem here is not in the value of the postmaterialist explanation, but 
what it was trying to explain. Researchers used the postmaterialist variable in order to explain 
utilitarian support. However, the postmaterialist argument is not suited for such an explanation. 
Postmaterialism cannot tell us how postmaterialists or materialists reach their opinions (Rochon 
1998). In fact, it may be possible for both value extremes to favor regional integration policy but 
for different reasons. It is easy to see that materialists would be in favor if they believe that 
regional integration will provide material and physical security. One can assume that 
postmaterialists would be in favor if they believe that it is a means to solve trans-national 
problems (e.g. clean air, water, etc.). Explaining support for an EU policy would benefit from a 
model that taps into the notion of common interests; in other words a model that conceptualizes 
individuals’ evaluations of the political community under development within the EU. This is the 
purpose of the following section. 
A power hierarchy trust model for supporting the CFSP 
Research that looks at common interest motivations for individual support for integration 
has mainly focused on the role of factors that would impede the formation of the political 
community. They echo the claim by Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule 
because it adds legitimacy to the governors by the governed. McLaren (2002) demonstrates that 
hostility towards other cultures determines attitudes towards the European Union. Likewise, a 
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strong national attachment lowers the probability that an individual will support regional 
integration (Carey 2002). In addition, Van Kersbergen (2000) explains support for the EU by 
examining the role integration has in forming primary national allegiances. His claim is that 
these attitudes pose a problem in developing a European identity and thereby lowers the chances 
of supporting the EU. In this paper, we shift attention away from individuals’ direct evaluations 
of the EU and towards the evaluations of member-states. We emphasize that common interest 
and self-interest are not mutually exclusive. By being part of a political community, an 
individual recognizes that one’s self-interest and the common interest are interdependent.  
Support for integration requires that individuals think of the project as a group effort and 
one based on long-term gains. The literature associated with social identity theory helps us 
understand why this is the case. Piaget (1965) stated that building attachments to groups is part 
of normal human behavior. These attachments promote cohesion among group members that are 
associated with the social-psychological phenomena of in-group bias and subjective images. One 
reason why an individual becomes a group member (the in-group) is due to an affective 
attachment (Terhune 1964; Winter 1973; Stogdill 1974; McClelland 1975; Bass 1981). An 
individual forms an emotional attachment because the group fulfills some symbolic value. At the 
level of national identity, individuals attach themselves because they see the nation as the 
embodiment of what is important (DeLamater et al. 1969). In the same vein, individuals will 
cooperate with individuals who are members of an out-group if the out-group’s members share 
some commonality with in-group members (Brewer 1968).  
Cooperation among similar groups is fueled by their trust of each other. One often cited 
definition of trust is the perceived “probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group 
doing anything to bring them about” (Gamson 1968: 54). That is, group members will not need 
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to monitor each other because there is confidence that interests are aligned. Putnam (1993) 
shows that the level of trust one has for others produces efficient institutional performance 
because of the higher probability of obtaining cooperation. It lowers the costs of association 
because of the perception that individuals will not cheat or defect. In paraphrasing Wintrobe 
(1995: 46), trust thus yields a stream of future returns on exchanges that would not otherwise 
take place because trust makes behavior predictable and stable. Therefore, groups may overlap to 
a certain extent to function not only as separate units but also, as an integrated unit when 
perceived similarities are present. When similarities are not present, overlapping memberships 
do not occur and group status becomes exclusive. The importance of similarities in building 
cohesion lies in understanding in-group biases.  
In-group bias is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of their in-
group versus others who are not members (the out-group members). The cause of this bias, as put 
forth by Tajfel (1981; 1982), is due to positive evaluations individuals have for members of their 
group. They join and are identified by such groups because, as stated above, the group symbolizes 
a set of values. By associating with similar-valued individuals, self- esteem improves because 
values are reinforced. This self-esteem further improves when individuals make favorable 
comparisons between the in-group and out-group. Not only are they part of a subjectively valued 
group, the in-group is also subjectively judged as better than the other out-groups. Therefore, by 
tying an individual’s social identity to the importance of the in-group, group maintenance or 
cooperation for group survival becomes important. To this end, individuals will tend to give 
favorable biases to fellow group members.  
Since cohesiveness is a function of in-group evaluations associated with identity, it is 
important to revisit the possible phenomenon of overlapping in-groups. This is important in the 
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context of Europe because the formation of a supranational identity is not theorized to replace 
national identities but to coexist with them (Deutsch et al. 1957). This is where the concept of 
image becomes important. Kelman states that image  
…refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive 
system. The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it 
refers – the individual’s conception of what this object is like. Image is an 
inferred construct, however, rather than a mere designation of the way the object 
is phenomenally experienced. (1965: 24) 
 
Scott, more succinctly, defines “…an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the 
totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation” 
(1965: 72). In addition such an image is the “property of the individual who beholds the object” 
(Kelman 1965: 27) meaning that the image is not objective and may therefore be dependent on 
various factors. Individuals can therefore use images of other groups to formulate likes and dislikes 
for and positive or negative stereotypes of out-groups (Druckman et al. 1974; Hewstone 1986; 
Druckman 1994). Image therefore implies greater cooperation as members of in-groups view the 
values of out-group members as similar and therefore compatible. Groups can, by this mechanism, 
tie themselves together. Recall that individuals tend to form groups, in part, because of emotional 
importance to the group’s symbolic values. If a subset of such values is present in other groups, 
then cooperation will form without necessarily dissolving in-group affiliations.  
In the context of European integration, an individual may support EU actions when s/he has a 
positive image of other member-states. This perception may result from evaluations of similar 
preferences on a number of issues leading individuals to view member-states as more in line with 
their in-group (their country). However, each member-state does not have an equal weight in the 
decision-making process. Like in many other regions, relative wealth, population, and capabilities 
(among others) determine which country’s preferences will be enacted within the EU and which 
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ones will be held in check. Specifically, the more powerful (the largest and wealthiest) countries 
will tend to have their wishes debated and implemented (Moravcsik 1991 & 1993).  Since the EU 
project is one of voluntary cooperation, countries can and do opt-out of further integration if their 
preferences are not in line with the more powerful members. The propensity to integrate comes 
under certain structural conditions:  a regional system must include both a set of asymmetrical 
power relationships and an associated satisfaction with how to develop integration (Efird and 
Genna 2002). The regional leader of the hierarchy strongly influences the institutional construction 
jointly through its preferences and its ability to foster stability (Krasner 1976; Keohane and Nye 
1977). 
Keeping in mind the relevance of the power hierarchy’s influence on integration, 
individuals’ images of EU member-states shouldinfluence the amount of trust they will have in 
them. Geva and Hanson (1999) have shown in experimental work that individuals’ reactions to 
events by countries do modify how they think of them. Given the nature of a CFSP, the committed 
role of the more powerful countries in Europeans’ perceptions would need to be credible. 
Defection from an established CFSP by smaller member-states would be quantitatively and 
qualitatively different than a defection by Germany. Therefore, trust in more powerful member-
states should have a greater influence in predicting the probability of an individual supporting the 
CFSP than trust in small and economically weak EU members. Being generally aware of the 
European power hierarchy, citizen attitudes towards Europe’s defense and foreign policies should 
be shaped by their diffuse feelings towards those actors that have the greatest influence on the 
overall course within these policy areas. Faith in the EU’s small but wealthy members (i.e. 
Denmark and the Benelux countries), should take a middle ground: while these countries are not as 
powerful and influential as Germany, France and the United Kingdom, their relative wealth allows 
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them to exert a tangible impact on Europe’s defense and foreign policies. As a result, trust in this 
group of countries should explain a small but important amount of individual-level variation.  
 
Data description and testing procedures 
In order to test these claims, we rely on public opinion data from multiple Eurobarometer 
surveys (1992-1997). These surveys were selected because they all included the key independent 
variables, trust in member-states. Given data constraints, the analysis includes only samples from 
eleven members of the EU, which include the first twelve members except Luxemburg. Some of 
the samples were collapsed while others were not included:  The Northern Ireland sample was 
collapsed into the British sample and the East German sample was omitted given its unique 
attributes.
1
 We used a weighted variable (the nation weight) so that no sub-national group will be 
over or under representation and results can be interpreted with attention to variations within 
country samples.
2
  
OLS regression techniques are not permissible because the dependent variables are 
dichotomous. Applying OLS techniques will produce inefficient coefficients that may lead to 
type one and two errors. The appropriate technique is to employ binary logit regression models 
(Long 1997). The evaluations of the coefficients will be based on their significance, direction of 
signs, and their contribution to predicting the probabilities of the dependent variables.  
                                                 
1
 The East German sample may exhibit questionable results given its early phase of democratic transition and its 
recent membership at the time of the surveys, which may distort findings. One such fear is an inaccuracy of 
questionnaire responses due to the public’s long legacy of authoritarianism. 
 
2
 The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual level analysis. While some researchers believe that aggregation 
of individual level responses to opinion surveys remove random “noise” from the measurements (Page and 
Shapiro 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), recent research shows that the error associated with 
individual level variation may be systemic (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000). Therefore aggregating the data 
would not remove any associated “noise,” but instead may harm the robustness of potential results due to a lower 
number of observations.  
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Dependent variables 
The dependent variables are individual support for a common defense and common foreign 
policies. A question frequently asked in the Eurobarometer surveys is whether a type of policy 
would be best handled at the national level or the European level of decision-making: 
Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the 
(NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly 
within the European Community. Which of the following areas of policy do you 
think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be 
decided jointly within the European Community.  
1.  Should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government 
2.  Should be decided jointly within the European Community [Union] 
Security and defense and Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Community 
[Union] were two policy areas presented to respondents. Responses were recoded so “national 
level decision-making” has a value of zero and “EC/U level decision-making” has a value of one 
for each of the two variables.  
Independent variables – power hierarchy trust 
The main independent variables of this paper measure the respondents’ trust levels in other 
member-states. Specifically, we rely on the following survey question from the Eurobarometer:
3
 
Which, if any, European Community [Union] country or countries do you think can be 
more trusted politically than others?  
0.  Not mentioned 1.  Mentioned 
The respondents go through the list of member-states and indicate which members are more 
trustworthy than others, including their own.
4
 The data was recoded so that all responses 
                                                 
3
 While this question does not directly ask if the member-states can be trusted in the context of the EU or 
integration, the years in which they were asked (1992 – 1997) were years of the deepening of integration 
(implementation of the Single European Act and the Maastricht debate). The public discourse in these years 
would therefore reflect the saliency of the EU.  
 
4
 So as to include consistency for the 1992-1997 analysis, only trust in the first twelve members of the EU are 
included.  
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indicating trust in the respondent’s own country are considered missing because the independent 
variable is to measure trust in member-states other than the respondent’s own state.  
[Place Table One Here] 
This question was not posed to all national samples in all years. Table one indicates which 
countries’ populations were sampled by year. There is a larger frequency of respondents coming 
from France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Spain. The Danes, Irish, Portuguese, Belgians, Dutch, 
and Greeks were polled only once either in 1994 or 1995. Only the Italians were polled 
consistently from 1992-1997. Since the Luxemburg respondents were not polled at all, this 
leaves a total of eleven national samples. This pattern of sampling is not statistical problem for 
two reasons. First, since the nation weight is employed in the analysis, the results explain within-
country variances. Therefore no biases are introduced. Second, since country dummy variables 
are also employed (see the following section), the analysis will control for country effects.  
[Place Figure One Here] 
Figure one illustrates the distribution of trust in the four wealthier and large members of the 
EU by national sample. Almost all the national samples selected Germany as the most trusted 
among the four. The only exceptions were the Irish and Portuguese samples, which favored 
France. France was the second most trusted with the exceptions being the Dutch and Danish 
samples, which favored Britain as their second choice. Although not included in the figure, all 
other member-states received small percentages. 
According to our theory, trust in the more powerful member states has a larger effect on 
individual-level support than trust in less wealthy countries. In order to capture this dynamic, we 
created three additive indices for trust in the wealthy and powerful member states (Germany, 
France, and the United Kingdom; hereafter “first tier”), trust in the wealthy but small member 
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states (Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg; hereafter “second tier”), and trust in 
the small and less prosperous countries (Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy; hereafter “third 
tier”). Specifically, we add up the number of member states within each country group that an 
individual trusts and divide this sum by the overall number of states per group. By dividing the 
additive term by the appropriate number, the range of the variable is restricted to between zero 
and one, thereby allowing comparability.  
In order to estimate the reliability of these scales, we calculated alpha scores for each of 
these three indices. While the results for the second and third tier country indices are respectable 
(.71 and .72, respectively), the first tier alpha of .51 is unacceptable (DeVellis 1991). As a result, 
we keep the index for the second and third tier countries and rely on three separate variables to 
measure trust in Germany, France, and Britain.  
 
Control variables 
The analysis requires the use of control variables so that the results are understood in the 
light of some prevailing hypotheses. In the following analysis, we account for a standard set of 
covariates employed in the literature on public opinion and European integration.  
Education. To measure this variable, we use a standard question found in all 
Eurobarometer surveys:  How old were you when you stopped full-time education? The 
responses are then collapsed into 9 groups:  values from 1 to 8 begin with the age of 14 and end 
with the age of 21, with the value 9 assigned to those who finished after the age of 22. 
Individuals who are still studying are coded missing. This may introduce error into the 
measurement because the hypothesized link with the dependent variable is in regard to the 
amount of education and not when the individual finished formal schooling. Anyone who is still 
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studying may have already been in school for some time and have reached a hypothetical 
threshold of having had enough education to influence support for the CFSP. Unfortunately they 
will not be included because it is unknown where they are in their education.  
Age. This information, measured in years, is included in the regular set of demographic 
variables found in the Eurobarometer surveys. The variable was recoded into five categories 
representing specific age cohorts. An alternative argument would be that memories of war would 
influence older Europeans to favor the CFSP, more so than younger Europeans. Prior research on 
support for integration demonstrated that this factor has diminished as the memory of the war 
fades (Gabel 1998). However, it may still prove important in the context of this analysis.  
Income. Respondents were asked to choose from among four categories that approximates 
their annual household income in each survey. An alternative hypothesis is that respondents’ 
with higher incomes are more likely to support for a CFSP.  
Ideology. Prior research demonstrates the negative association nationalism has on support 
for integration (McLaren 2002; Carey 2003). One method to measure this possible effect is 
through left-right self-evaluations. The respondents were asked to place themselves on a left-
right continuum. The range is one to ten with ten being the most extreme rightist ideology. An 
alternative hypothesis is that the higher values of this variable will be negatively associated with 
supporting the CSFP.  
Country and year effects. Country and year dummies are included in each of the models but 
the results are not reported due to space constraints. These dummy variables control for effects 
that are specific to either the countries in the analysis or the year of the surveys. In each 
regression the base country is Belgium and the base year is 1992.  
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Explaining support for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
In order to test our hypotheses about member-state trust and support for the common 
foreign and security policy, we introduced the variables described above in a series of six 
statistical models. This approach is necessary since trust in Germany, France, and Britain is 
measured with three separate variables. Introducing all of these covariates into the same 
regression model would lead to a significant drop in the number of observations. As mentioned 
earlier, trust in one’s own country is coded as “missing.” Therefore, simultaneously controlling 
for trust in Germany, France, and Britain would lead to an exclusion of survey responses from all 
of these countries which would likely introduce systematic bias into our statistical results. 
[Place Tables Two and Three here] 
In Models 1-3 we estimate the effect of trust in Germany (Model 1), France (Model 2). and 
Britain (Model 3) on the common defense and security policy while controlling for trust in 
second- and third tier countries.
5
 In Models 4-6, the dependent variable is support for the EU’s 
common foreign policy. The overall results of the analysis show that member-state trust is an 
important factor in explaining support for the CFSP. Specifically, trust in the most powerful 
member-state, Germany, improves the likelihood that the respondent would favor a common set 
of security and foreign policies.  
Moving to a more detailed discussion of the results, Model 1 indicates that trust in 
Germany and the second tier member-states are statistically significant in predicting support for 
a common defense and security policy. However, the third tier index is not significant. These 
findings are in line with the main hypothesis of this paper: the further down the power hierarchy, 
the less significant in predicting support. The second column of results in table two shows the 
                                                 
5
 The country and year dummy variables where included in the regression but not listed due to space constrains. 
Also, the postmaterialist, cognitive mobilization, and satisfaction with EU level democracy were also included in 
separate regressions with no effect on the key trust variables.  
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marginal changes in the predicted probabilities. Each value is the change in the probability 
associated with each independent variable as it moves from its minimum to its maximum value 
while holding the other variables constant at their median values. A respondent is about 10 
percentage points more likely to support a common defense and security policy if s/he perceives 
Germany as being politically trustworthy than if s/he does not. The probability increases less, 
about 7 percentage points, if the respondent trusts all four second tier member-states instead of 
none. The larger value for the Germany-trust variable compared to the second tier variable 
indicates that individuals’ trust in Germany explains a larger amount of change in the likelihood 
that respondents will support a common defense and security policy.  
Model two substitutes the Germany-trust variable with the France-trust variable. Of the 
three trust variables, only the France-trust and second tier trust variables are significant. 
However, this time the second tier trust variable explains a greater amount of change in the 
dependent variable. Trusting all four of the second tier member-states improves the probability 
of support by 8 percentage points. By contrast, the France-trust variable only improves the same 
probability by 4 percentage points.  
Model three completes the analysis of support for the common defense and security 
variable. This time the Britain-trust variable is substituted. In this model, the Britain-trust and 
third tier trust variables are not significant, leaving only the second tier trust variable as 
predictors of support. When the average respondent trusts all four second tier member-states, the 
probability that s/he will support a common policy increases by 8.2 percentage points, which is 
similar to the probability established in model two. 
In sum, trust in Germany explains the largest amount of change in the probability that the 
respondent will support a common defense and security policy. Also, recall that model one 
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includes national samples from the eleven member-states expect Germany. Therefore trust in the 
most powerful EU member-state, among the non-German national samples, explains the largest 
change in the likelihood of support. This stands in stark contrast with the results of the non-
French national samples, which did not uncover a strong association between support and 
trusting France. The worst performer of the three top European powers was Britain: trusting 
Britain has no statistically significant association with support for a common defense policy and 
is therefore no different than the third tier member-states in this regard.  
Table three presents the results of the binary logit regression with support for a common 
foreign policy as the dependent variable. The results are slightly different from the ones 
presented in Table two. While the Germany-trust variable still explains a larger change in the 
probability for support, trust in the second tier member-states loses its statistical value. Model 
four’s results show that only the Germany-trust variable has statistical significance: trust in 
Germany increases the probability to support a common foreign policy by about 4 percentage 
points. Model five indicates that trusting France increases this probability by 2.2 percentage 
points and trusting all four second tier member-states similarly increases the probability by 2 
percentage points. However, both the variables in model five are weakly significant. Model six 
indicates that trust in Britain is very weakly significant and does not change the probability 
much, relatively speaking. In fact, the second tier trust variable has a larger marginal change, 
0.033 vs. 0.014. As before, trust in Germany predicts the largest change in the probability for 
supporting a CFSP among individuals in the non-German national samples. It also has greater 
significance than the other trust variables.  
Conclusion 
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The political cohesion model can be an aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting 
the CFSP. Trust in the member-states among individuals is significantly associated with higher 
probabilities of support. However, not all member-states have the same impact. Three distinct 
groupings exist with each grouping determined by country size and wealth. The smaller and less 
wealthy a country is, the less of an impact it has on influencing support for a CFSP. But when it 
comes to the top powers in Europe (Germany, France, and Britain) clear distinctions are made 
among the respondents. Trust in Germany has more importance among individuals than trusting 
the other larger and wealthier powers, namely France and Britain. Trust in France does give us 
some explanation for support, but values are not as large as those associated with Germany. 
Britain proves to be statistically not significant.  
Two important issues must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these 
issues would necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important 
enough to consider. First, given that the earliest surveys used in this analysis are about twenty 
years old, we would need to obtain up-to-date data that indicates that the association between 
trust and support has not changed. However, there is nothing in the model’s logic that makes the 
arguments any less salient today. Year dummy variables were not significantly different from the 
base year, which indicates that there is a lack of temporal influence. However, more current data 
is an important way to determine if the findings of the 1990s hold today.  
Second, the EU’s eastward expansion adds complexity to model. The security and foreign 
policies of countries such as Poland and the Baltic states are not in line with those of Germany. 
Decisions on troop deployments to Iraq, heated disagreements at EU Council meetings over the 
Iraqi war, and debates about the most appropriate foreign policy towards Russia are evidence of 
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this. If our results hold, less trust in Germany in the post-Cold War membership expansion may 
lead to less support for a CFSP.  
 20 
Table 1. National samples for “political trust” variables by year 
 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
France ● ●  ● ● ● 
Germany ● ●  ● ● ● 
Britain ● ●  ● ● ● 
Spain ● ●  ● ● ● 
Italy ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Denmark   ●    
Ireland   ●    
Portugal   ●    
Belgium    ●   
Netherlands    ●   
Greece    ●   
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Table 2. Logit model:  Support for EU defense and security policy on trust in member-states 
 
 Model 1 Probabilities Model 2 Probabilities Model 3 Probabilities 
Trust variables       
Trust in Germany .437*** 
(.044) 
.095 -- -- -- -- 
Trust in France -- -- .162*** 
(.050) 
.037 -- -- 
Trust in Britain -- -- -- -- -.025 
(.053) 
-.006 
Trust in second tier .304*** 
(.082) 
.067 .365***  
(.078) 
.080 .402*** 
(.078) 
.082 
Trust in third tier -.087 
(.143) 
-.021 -.092  
(.136) 
-.022 -.095 
(.130) 
-.021 
Control variables       
Age .007  
(.013) 
.009 .010 
(.013) 
.012 .004 
(.013) 
.004 
Education .089*** 
(.008) 
.162 .088*** 
(.008) 
.154 .088*** 
(.008) 
.150 
Income .058** 
(.019) 
.041 .081*** 
(.019) 
.057 .034* 
(.018) 
.023 
Left/Right self-placement -.052*** 
(.010) 
-.111 -.045*** 
(.016) 
-.093 -.027*** 
(.009) 
-.054 
Constant .230 
(.226) 
 .239 
(.226) 
 .385 
(.224) 
 
χ2  
(degrees of freedom) 
1025.34*** 
(21) 
 1016.97*** 
(21) 
 802.58*** 
(21) 
 
log likelihood -8905.95  -8995.30  -8847.17  
N 13,811  13,938  13,584  
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses. Estimates for country & year dummies omitted due to space 
constraints. 
***p≤ .000; ** p ≤ .010; * p ≤ .050 
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Table 3. Logit model:  Support for EU common foreign policy on trust in member-states 
 
 Model 4 Probabilities Model 5 Probabilities Model 6 Probabilities 
       
Trust variables       
Trust in Germany .333*** 
(.055) 
.038 -- -- -- -- 
Trust in France -- -- .186** 
(.062) 
.022 -- -- 
Trust in Britain -- -- -- -- .115* 
(.066) 
.014 
Trust in second tier .118 
(.096) 
.015 .196* 
(.092) 
.023 .297** 
(.094) 
.033 
Trust in third tier -.152 
(.164) 
-.020 -.212 
(.154) 
-.028 -.216  
(.156) 
-.029 
Control variables       
Age -.049*  
(.015) 
-.032 -.028 
(.015) 
-.018 -.010 
(.016) 
-.006 
Education .028*** 
(.009) 
.029 .037*** 
(.009) 
.035 .047*** 
(.009) 
.045 
Income .077*** 
(.022) 
.031 .098*** 
(.022) 
.038 .107*** 
(.023) 
.041 
Left/Right self-placement -.026* 
(.011) 
-.030 -.023 
(.012) 
-.026 -.012 
(.012) 
-.013 
Constant 1.64*** 
(.293) 
 1.57*** 
(.290) 
 1.36*** 
(.293) 
 
χ2  
(degrees of freedom) 
519.02*** 
(21) 
 509.08***  
(21) 
 342.76*** 
(21) 
 
log likelihood -6957.65  -7032.91  -6477.84  
N 13,242  13,376  13,066  
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses. Estimates for country & year dummies omitted due to 
space constraints. 
***p≤ .000; ** p ≤ .010; * p ≤ .050 
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Figure 1. Percentage of trust in European powers by country samples 
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